1. Putin’s goal is to appear tough on corruption, but not change the status quo – it will have limited success
2. Putin’s goal is to legitimately reduce the role of corruption in Russia-related business transactions (particularly those involving state-owned entities) – it will fail miserably, except in isolated, anecdotal cases

There’s also the chaos element – the release of information in a highly wired country like Russia can have a disproportionately high impact. Thus, any campaign predicated on increased disclosure has the potential to be more effective than the authorities ever intended (I think publishing all public tender documentation online is a good example). It would have been much smarter of Putin to simply ‘ban’ contracts with companies for which ultimate ownership cannot be established. In contrast, a disclosure policy can be policed and analyzed by the public in an ‘uncontrolled’ setting.

There’s also the impact of the new offshore laws in the civil and criminal codes, which may have a chilling effect on Russians wishing to incorporate in an offshore jurisdiction. Still, I think offshore structures will continue to play a significant role in Russian business transactions for a while yet.

You are generally right here, in that Ukraine 2004 too had a much broader swath of age and income represented (despite the clear regional differences between orange and blue). But Moscow is the center of a very centralized country and it sets the trend for the whole nation (again, see 1991). Many of my Russian colleagues, for example, are not native Muscovites but young transplants from around the country. They were “transmitting” information about the first protests and the mood in the capital on Dec 5-6 to the regions.

“This is why, much to the State Department’s chagrin, we cannot expect a “Color Revolution” in Russia – seriously, who would take over?”

Perhaps McCain, Heritage, NDI and NED are delighted, but I wouldn’t say that State is excited. After all, the reset policy is being challenged and they are now trying to piece together the changes and impact.

I would add that what I saw in Moscow in December was less like the Orange Revolution, and much more like the “Ukraine Without Kuchma” protests in 2000-01. That protest was eventually shut down and it featured a vague message of “Kuchma Out!” and “fair elections”. It chiefly included the most anti-regime activists and hardcore nationalist elements. Eventually, Ukrainians (both national-democratic and right-wing elements — and then political opportunists) rallied around a former member of government and oligarch and consolidated a movement into something much bigger.

If Putin knew anything about the “color revolutions,” he would be attacking Kudrin and Prokhorov and ignoring Navalny. That’s why many think both of their recent activities are suspiciously pro-Kremlin. But I would also say that Putin is increasingly out of touch (he admitted he has no time for internet) and the number of the protesters show that the genie is out of the bottle.

I completely agree this move was not decided years ago, and more likely began to coalesce within the last 8 months. I believe if Medvedev could have gotten Russia to a situation (or satisfied Putin that such was the case) whereby it was no longer a target for constant western meddling in its political process, Putin probably would have gone or perhaps accepted a subordinate role such as running the Olympics or something. But that will not happen in the immediate future, and I believe Putin feels a more authoritarian hand is needed for the present.

Blowing the oil money on foreign consumer goods was characteristic of the Putin era? For who? I thought the state was extremely cagey with the oil money, and very farseeing in having salted it away for a rainy day instead of throwing it around – that surplus saved their bacon in the global financial crash. If you mean individual consumers, I suppose it’s a consequence of having more disposable income, which could hardly count as a negative for the government. A government that encourages its citizens to buy large homes when they don’t have steady jobs would be a good example of a negative for the government.

The USA has an enormous deficit, and presumably that’s just math, too. But a lot of people seem quite worried about it.

I don’t mean to be adversarial, because you obviously understand finance a great deal better than I. But I can’t grasp why a return by Putin is some kind of gasping horror when most analysts acknowledge he dragged the nation back from the brink of ruin and was the greatest Russian leader of the modern age. Especially when the only alternatives would be Medvedev or the Communists. Russia didn’t do badly under Medvedev, but it didn’t achieve anything remarkable, either, and I can’t believe the west wants the Communists back in the driver’s seat. There’s nobody in the Liberal stable who could be sent to look for lettuce in a green salad, and certainly nothing that sounds remotely like a plan for national greatness – just a lot of criticism of the only party that’s actually doing something.

In any case, let’s assume you are right – oil prices rise, and thus more money for Russia. But what is done with that money? Is it invested in new productive capacity, to boost oil exports and stimulate the development of nascent innovative industries? Or does the oil wealth lead to binge spending on foreign consumer goods? If it is the latter – which is consistent with Putin’s era – then a current account surplus would be an anomalous result because the money spent abroad and declining exports from lagging productive capacity would ultimately overtake the benefits of increased oil prices.

And even if Russia continues with a ‘healthy surplus,’ this is just math – it’s a derivative indicator that may or may not say something about the underlying health of the economy. And here again, I would argue that 10 more years of Putin will not be kind to the underlying economy.

Let’s have another look in 3 years and see if you’re right, shall we? I predict not. Oil supplies are forecast to tighten in 2012, and that likely means higher oil prices. Given Putin’s past record of fiscal prudence, Russia’s current account balance should continue in healthy surplus. If you mean Russia won’t be a western-style market democracy with strip malls and urban sprawl, you’re probably right, but that hasn’t got a lot to recommend it right now. Since the main proponent of that system doesn’t seem to be doing so good.

From Medvedev’s speech at the EdRo conference: Я хочу полностью подтвердить то, что только что было сказано. То, что мы предлагаем съезду, это глубоко продуманное решение. И даже больше, мы действительно обсуждали этот вариант развития событий ещё в тот период, когда сформировался наш товарищеский союз.

And FWIW I wrote that they “suggested” this, not that they precisely stated it. They certainly did NOT say something to the effect that “this was decided over the past week, month, etc”